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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR USED CAR
DEALERS
The imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers for
injuries caused by defective products has become a widely ac-
cepted precept of products liability law.' A number of jurisdic-
tions have extended the strict liability doctrine to include re-
tailers of defective goods.' Given this trend toward expansion
of the doctrine, it is not surprising that the issue of whether the
strict products liability doctrine is applicable to used car deal-
ers has arisen. This issue presents some difficult questions con-
cerning the remedies available to the buyer. Is he "stuck" if the
car fails to meet his expectations and causes injury to himself
or others, or can the buyer reasonably expect the used car
dealer to assume the responsibility incurred by placing the
defective product on the market?
The Appellate Court of Illinois recently grappled with
these questions in Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co. 3 The
case arose from an accident in which one child was killed and
another was seriously injured when they were struck by an
automobile whose brakes had failed. The automobile involved
had been purchased shortly before the accident from the defen-
dant, a used car dealer. The plaintiff sought recovery on a strict
liability theory, alleging that the car's braking system had been
defective at the time the automobile left the used car dealer's
control. Following dismissal of two counts of the plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a cause of action,4 the plaintiff
' The concept of manufacturer's strict liability despite the plaintiff's lack of priv-
ity and his failure to give timely notice of the breach has been recognized in 28 states.
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1965); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery
Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966).
2 The strict liability concept has been extended to include retailers in 13 states.
See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Sweeney v. Matthews, 236 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. 1966); Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741
(Ky. 1966); Coca-Cola Bot. Co. v. Hobart, 423 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1968).
307 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. App. 1974).
4 The issue of whether bystanders should benefit from the application of § 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was also presented in Peterson but is not ad-
dressed in this comment. To date there have been seven jurisdictions which have
extended strict tort liability to bystanders who are innocently injured. See Sills v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Caruth v. Mariani, 463 P.2d
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appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, which reversed and
remanded, holding that the doctrine of strict liability was ap-
plicable to sellers of used automobiles.
The Peterson decision represents the first case in which the
strict liability doctrine has been applied to sellers of used prod-
ucts. Consumers in other jurisdictions will undoubtedly utilize
the decision to seek extension of strict liability to sellers of used
goods, particularly sellers of used automobiles. Thus, Peterson
serves as a frame of reference for analysis of this problem in
Kentucky as well as other jurisdictions. This comment will first
examine the arguments in support of extension of strict liabil-
ity to used car dealers. Consideration will then be given to the
closely related theories of implied warranty of fitness and im-
plied warranty of merchantability. Finally, attention will be
focused upon the prospects for application of strict liability to
sellers of used goods in Kentucky.
I. THE SETrING: Greenman, SECTION 402A OF THE
RESTATEMENT, AND THE "CHAIN OF DISTREBUTION"
The concept of strict products liability grounded purely in
tort is relatively new. It was first enunciated in 1962 by the
California Supreme Court in the case of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc .5 Greenman was injured when a combina-
tion power tool, a gift from his wife, malfunctioned, causing a
piece of wood to strike the plaintiff on the head, inflicting
serious injuries. Approximately ten and one-half months later,
Greenman gave the retailer and manufacturer written notice of
the claimed breaches of warranties. In the ensuing action
against the tool manufacturer, the prevailing contractual
theory of manufacturer's liability posed two seemingly insur-
mountable barriers to Greenman's recovery. This theory re-
83 (Ariz. 1970); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969); Mitchell v. Miller, 214 A.2d 694 (Conn. 1965); Embs v. Pepsi Cola Bot. Co.,
C.A. No. 12,236 (Ky., May 23, 1975); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d
129 (Mich. 1965); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969). For commen-
tary on this question see Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to
Bystanders, 38 TmN. L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, Strict Products Liability to the By-
stander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. Cm. L. Rev. 625 (1971); Com-
ment, Tort: Recovery by a Bystander in Strict Liability, 8 TULSA L.J. 216 (1972).
5 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). For a full treatment of this topic, see
Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1966).
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
quired that the plaintiff comply with all contractual proce-
dures regarding notice of breach and that the plaintiff be in
privity with the manufacturer. Greenman had failed to comply
with the notice requirements of California's Uniform Sales Act.
More important, however, was the fact that Greenman was not
in privity with the tool manufacturer. As the donee of a gift,
he was neither a contracting party nor a successor in interest
to the legal rights of a contracting party;6 and a long line of
California decisions7 had firmly refused to extend the "war-
ranty without privity" exception beyond cases involving adul-
terated foods.
Justice Traynor overcame these obstacles by declaring
that this was a case of strict liability in tort and that, therefore,
the plaintiff was not bound by the limitations of the contrac-
tual warranty theory.8 Balancing the privity and notice require-
ments against the demands of public safety, Justice Traynor
concluded that, because the privity rule functioned more often
as a device to defeat meritorious claims than as a valid limita-
tion on liability,9 it should be abandoned. He reasoned that
public safety required that anyone supplying human beings
with potentially hazardous products should be held to the high-
est degree of care.
The concept of strict products liability in tort was adopted
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts"0 in 1965. Based upon the
public safety rationale espoused by Justice Traynor in
6 BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 1361 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
Hale v. Depaoli, 201 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); Nebelung v. Norman, 96 P.2d 327 (Cal.
1939); Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 59 P.2d 100 (Cal. 1936); Kalash v. Los Angeles
Ladder Co., 34 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1934); Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 7 P.2d 1013 (Cal.
1929); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Paraffine Paint Co., 204 P. 1076 (Cal. 1922); Cliff v.
California Spray-Chemical Co., 257 P. 99 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Catlin v. Union
Oil Co., 161 P. 29 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1916). Compare Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car
Div., 302 P.2d 665 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 323 P.2d
227 (Cal. App. Dep't Sup. Ct. 1957).
8 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory
of an express warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff...
the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed
by law . . . make[s] clear that the liability is not one governed by the law
of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
Compare, Note, 50 N.C.L. Rxv. 697 (1972).
377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToaTS § 402A (1965).
[Vol. 63
COMMENTS
Greenman," the Restatement clarified the products liability
doctrine and explained its elements. Any user or consumer of
a product may rely upon this doctrine without regard to privity
or the care exercised by the defendant. The plaintiff must
prove, however, that 1) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling the product, 2) the product was in fact defective, 3)
the defect existed at the time the product left the hands of the
seller, 4) the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous,
and 5) the defect was the proximate cause of the injury."2
Illinois accepted the strict liability doctrine in 1965 in the
case of Suvada v. White Motor Co. 3 In this case Suvada, who
had been held liable in a tort action resulting from an accident
involving his truck, sought indemnity from the truck manufac-
turer for the judgment he had paid in the prior suit. The Appel-
late Court of Illinois concluded that Suvada could recover
under the strict liability theory if he could prove the elements
specified by the Restatement. The following year the Illinois
court extended the strict liability doctrine to retailers, and pos-
sibly wholesalers, in Sweeney v. Matthews."
II. THE Peterson DECISION AND ITS RATIONALE
As a result of the decision in Peterson v. Lou Backrodt
Chevrolet Co.," Illinois has become the first jurisdiction to
apply the doctrine of strict liability in tort to sellers of used
articles. Before considering the rationale of this decision, how-
ever, a brief statement of its facts will be useful.
In June of 1971 Cornelius Spradlin purchased a used 1965
Chevrolet from Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co. Less than four
months later the automobile struck Maradean and Mark Peter-
son, two small children who were walking on the side of the
road. Maradean was killed instantly and Mark suffered inter-
" RLESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Toms § 402A, comment f (1965) states:
The basis for the rule [of strict liability] is the ancient one of the special
responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into
the business of supplying human beings with products which may endanger
the safety of their persons and property, and the forced reliance upon that
undertaking on the part of those who purchase such goods.
12 RFrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Toms § 402A (1965).
"3 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. App. 1965).
" 236 N.E.2d 439 (Ill. App. 1968), aff'd, 264 N.E.2d 170 (111. 1970).
" 307 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. App. 1974).
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nal injuries. John Elder, the driver of the vehicle at the time
of the accident, stated that the children stepped into the path
of the car and that his attempt to avoid them by applying the
brakes was futile. The evidence showed that the brakes failed
due to specified defects in the braking system.
The defendant insisted that because he had informed the
buyer that the car was used, it was understood that the vehicle
had been subjected to "use and wear," thus relieving him of
liability. The Appellate Court of Illinois found otherwise, em-
phasizing that a used car dealer ". . is mistaken in equating,
as a matter of law, use and wear with a defect in the used car
making the vehicle unreasonably dangerous."'" The court,
quoting from Dunham v. Vaughan & Busnell Manufacturing
Co.," stated: "Although the definitions of the term 'defect' in
the context of products liability law use varying language, all
of them rest upon the common premise that those products are
defective which are dangerous because they fail to perform in
the manner reasonably to be expected in light of their nature
and intended function. ' 8
Based upon this reasoning, it is obvious that the Illinois
court viewed its decision as merely the logical extension of the
strict liability doctrine adopted in Suvada v. White Motor Co.'9
and Sweeney v. Matthews.' The court simply held that anyone
in the chain of distribution, whether a manufacturer, retailer,
wholesaler, or a seller of used products, should be held strictly
liable for any and all defective products he places into the
stream of commerce. Three reasons were cited by the Peterson
court to support this extension of the doctrine: 1) the dealer
deterrence principle, 2) the insurance doctrine, and 3) the
consumer reliance argument.
A. The Dealer Deterrence Principle
The dealer deterrence principle is based on the premise
that increased potential liability will affect the behavior of
dealers. The position taken by the Peterson court is that a used
IS Id. at 732.
247 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. 1969).
,S 307 N.E.2d at 732.
210 N.E.2d 182 (I1. App. 1965).
236 N.E.2d 439 (I1. App. 1968), aff'd, 264 N.E.2d 170 (Ill. 1970).
[Vol. 63
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car dealer threatened with strict liability for any injury-causing
defect in the cars he sells will exert the utmost care in inspect-
ing and preparing his automobiles for sale, 21 and that this addi-
tional care by the dealer will promote the policy of insuring
that only safe automobiles are placed on the public highways.
The viability of this principle is a subject of much contro-
versy. Proponents of the theory contend that the abolition of
the privity and notice defenses through strict liability and the
resulting increased vulnerability of dealers to adverse judg-
ments will be sufficient motivation to effect the desired change
in the standard of care. Opponents of the principle 22 find two
basic weaknesses in this argument. First, a dealer may often
fail to correct a defect due to an error in judgment concerning
the existence of the defect rather than negligent inspection. It
is agreed that such errors cannot be deterred by any means. 21
Second, it is asserted that no type of deterrence will serve to
increase the degree of care exercised by dealers. The opponents
of the principle argue that dealers have long been subject to
contractual liability and that such liability has not increased
the standard of care. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the
imposition of strict liability will have the desired effect of in-
creasing the degree of care exercised by dealers.
B. The Insurance Doctrine
The insurance doctrine is basically a justification for im-
posing the burden of strict products liability upon used car
dealers. The theory is that the dealer will be able to obtain an
insurance policy to cover his losses attributable to strict liabil-
ity, 25 thus reducing the financial hardship imposed on the
dealer. This system would provide two levels of cost spreading
and most effectively accomplish the strict liability objective of
loss reallocation. The dealer would distribute the cost of the
1, 307 N.E.2d at 732. See also Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d
828 (Tex. 1942); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRT § 402A, comment f (1965).
2 Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64
MxcH. L. REV., 1329, 1333 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liabil-
ity to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
23 Keeton, supra note 22, at 1333; Prosser, supra note 22, at 1122.
21 W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRT 650 (4th ed. 1971).
" Id. at 651.
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insurance premiums through the sale price of his used automo-
biles and the insurance company would reflect the damages it
paid on behalf of the dealer in the amount of the policy prem-
iums. 26
The protection of dealers provided by the insurance doc-
trine satisfies the demands of public policy. The dealer would
be insulated by the insurance company from the payment of
damages so disproportionate to the size of his operation that he
would be forced out of business. In addition, the consumer
would be guaranteed at least a minimal fund from which dam-
ages could be recovered. It must be noted, however, that the
success of the insurance doctrine rests entirely on the predilec-
tion of dealers to avail themselves of insurance protection. The
doctrine loses all meaning if the dealers are unwilling to obtain
the necessary coverage.
C. The Consumer Reliance Argument
The consumer reliance argument rests upon the premise
that the seller of used automobiles possesses a better bargain-
ing position than the consumer and that the imposition of strict
liability is warranted if the consumer detrimentally relies upon
the representations of the seller.Y To sustain this argument, the
validity of the premise must be examined.
The superiority of the used car dealer's position is based
on both his extended opportunity to inspect the vehicle and his
superior expertise. It is obvious that the dealer has the best
opportunity to inspect the car. If the dealer maintains the vehi-
cle in his possession for a sufficient period of time to place a
value on it, he must necessarily have sufficient time to ascer-
tain the condition of the vehicle.2 In contrast, the consumer
will, in most instances, have the opportunity for only an "on-
lot" inspection under the supervision of the dealer. The supe-
I The amount of the premiums would probably be linked directly to the conduct
of each dealer because the insurance policies involved would probably be a blanket
coverage for each dealer rather than a group coverage for an association of dealers. This
assumption is based upon the general opposition of the states to group liability insur-
ance. Such insurance is viewed as a device for granting preferred groups price conces-
sions which are not actuarily justified and result in unfairly discriminatory rates. See
generally P. KEoN, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 62-64 (1971).
See 2 L. FaumER & M. FPRIDMAN, PRODUCTS LiABmr § 16A[5][d] (1974).
2s Armour v. Haskins, 275 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1955).
[Vol. 63
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rior expertise of the dealer is derived from his continued deal-
ing with used automobiles through his participation in the
business. "The operator of the. . . business must be regarded
as possessing expertise with respect to the service, life, and
fitness of his vehicles for use. That expertise ought to put him
in a better position than [the buyer] to detect or to anticipate
. . . defects . . . in his vehicles ..... ,2 In comparison, the
consumer's knowledge of automobiles is limited by the relative
uniqueness, to the buyer, of the transaction.
Given the dealer's superior expertise and opportunity to
inspect, the consumer is virtually forced to rely upon the
dealer's representations. Such reliance makes the consumer
especially vulnerable to the misrepresentation of defects by the
dealer. It is this vulnerability which the advocates of the con-
sumer reliance argument assert as the justification for the im-
position of strict liability."
Adversaries of this argument allege that the imposition of
strict liability would place an unjust burden upon the dealer.
Many defects are not detectable through the normal means of
inspection; and it is unreasonable and totally impractical to
expect a dealer to disassemble each automobile before sale."
Strict liability should, therefore, be imposed only in those in-
stances in which the dealer failed to act in good faith during
the sales transaction.32
mH. IMPLIED WARRANTY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO STRIcT LBmrITY
An alternative to strict products liability, and indeed the
23 Cintron v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 778 (N.J. 1965).
Although this case involved rental dealers rather than used car dealers, the rationale
is applicable to all commercial transactions.
REsTATEME T (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965) and cases thereafter
cited in Appendix.
31 Although it denounced unduly burdensome standards of inspection, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in Gaidry Motors, Inc. v. Grannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1953),
held that there is a duty upon used car dealers to inspect the automobiles they sell.
The Court stated that it was not too harsh a rule to require used car dealers to use
reasonable care before resale to locate defects which the customer often cannot discover
until it is too late. In support of this view the Court noted such factors as: 1) the greater
likelihood of mechanical defects in older cars than in new ones; 2) the fairly rapid
turnover of ownership of used cars; 3) the fact that the majority of old cars are sold
through used car dealers; 4) the fact that the dealer has greater opportunity to discover
defects. See also Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 12, 43 (1966).
Armour v. Haskins, 275 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1955).
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traditional approach, is the contractual theory of implied war-
ranty.33 The two most important of these warranties are the
implied warranty of merchantability,34 which requires that a
particular product perform as well as that type of product per-
forms under normal circumstances, and the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose, 5 which requires that the
3 The concepts of implied warranty of fitness and implied warranty of merchanta-
bility first appeared in the nineteenth century. Initially confined to use in unwhole-
some food cases, the concepts were gradually extended to articles for intimate bodily
use, such as hair dyes and soaps. Having made this extension, the courts then extended
the warranty to all products. See Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036 (1967); Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F.
Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962), modified, 320 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1963); Brown v. Chrysler
Corp., 143 S.E.2d 575 (Ga. 1965); Wood v. Hub Motor Co., 137 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1964);
Lafayette Hwy. Equip. Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Dixie Truck and Equip. Serv., Inc., 179
So. 2d 479 (La. 1965); Citrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769
(N.J. 1965); Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Breed Mfg. Co., 85 S.E. 35 (N.C. 1915);
Bouchet v. Oregon Motor Car Co., 152 P. 888 (Ore. 1915). See also 77 C.J.S. Sales §§
324, 325, 327, 330 and cases therein cited; Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1387 (1968).
3' UNIFORM COMMaERCUL CODE § 2-314: Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage
of Trade:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving
for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere
is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of facts made on the con-
tainer or label if any.
See also Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent
Developments, 16 RUTGERs L. REv. 493 (1962); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of
Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315 states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
COMMENTS
product meet the particular need of the buyer as that need was
communicated to the seller. Although the Peterson court predi-
cated recovery upon strict liability and failed to mention im-
plied warranty as a possible basis for recovery, the two ap-
proaches are so closely related" that a discussion of implied
warranty is in order.
Under the English warranty doctrine, the plaintiff had to
show privity between himself and the seller before any recovery
would be allowed." Privity was shown by proving that the
plaintiff was either a contracting party or a successor in inter-
est possessing the same legal rights in the contract or property
as a contracting party.38 Initially, the requirement of privity
was equally prevalent in the United States, but the rule has
been gradually eroded .3  Although the privity requirement is
still important in implied warranty cases, the public policy of
recent years has emphasized protection of the consumer not-
withstanding the absence of privity. As a result, the privity
requirement has been largely eliminated in food and cosmetics
cases,4" as well as a number of automobile cases.4' The land-
See also Corman, Implied Sales Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958 Wis.
L. REv. 219.
' See Dickerson, The ABC's of Product Liability-With a Close Look at Section
402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439, 442 (1969):
What is not so clear is how the tort liability envisaged by [Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts] differs, if at all, from the tort liability
flowing from a breach of implied warranty.
The substantive differences, if any, are less significant than the differ-
ences in language would seem to suggest. The implied warranty of merchant-
ability is couched in terms of a standard of quality that the seller is expected
to meet. In safety terms, this means that the product must not injure the
consumer. Section 402A, on the other hand, tells us that the seller will be
liable if his product is unreasonably dangerous as a result of being defective.
Because the standard of compliance with the safety aspects of merchantabil-
ity is the exact converse of the standard of noncompliance envisaged by
Section 402A, there appears to be no significant difference in the two stan-
dards of safety. Each creates a general obligation of quality and each creates
it with reference to a sale of personal property. Both are said to carry the
flavor of tort.
31 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 622 (4th ed. 1971).
BLAcK's LAW DicnoNARY 1361 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
40 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bot. Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944); Klein v.
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mark decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.42 enun-
ciated the principle that the purchaser of an automobile may
proceed against the manufacturer or seller under implied war-
ranty without regard to the presence or absence of privity. In
Henningsen both the dealer and the manufacturer were held
liable to the purchaser under an implied warranty of safety
when the purchaser's wife was injured.
Whether the privity requirement has been incorporated
into the Uniform Commercial Code is debatable. The courts
are well divided on the issue. Although some jurisdictions have
held that the implied warranties are confined to the buyer of a
product,43 there is ample authority to the contrary." Given the
Henningsen stance on privity, a collateral issue ripe for resolu-
tion is whether the implied warranties are applicable to buyers
of used products. The U.C.C. does not explicitly state that the
§ 2-314 warranty of merchantability45 and the § 2-315 warranty
of fitness46 apply to sales of second-hand goods. However, Com-
ment 3 to § 2-314 implies that although the warranty is applic-
able to used goods, it would not be the same as the warranty
of merchantability for new goods. 47
No case has held a used car dealer liable on the theory of
breach of implied warranty; however, some courts have indi-
cated in dicta that they would so hold.48 Such a holding would
Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1939).
4, See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, -Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960);
General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960).
42 161 A.2d 69, 84 (N.J. 1960). The exact wording of the holding was as follows:
Accordingly, we hold that under modem marketing conditions, when a man-
ufacturer puts a new auto in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase
by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as
such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser.
4 See, e.g., Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 382 P.2d 399 (Nev. 1963); Smith v.
Salem Coca-Cola Bot. Co., 25 A.2d 125 (N.H. 1942).
" See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965);
Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1962).
4 See note 34 supra.
"1 See note 35 supra.
11 Comment 3 states in part: "A contract for the sale of second hand goods,
however, involves only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods for that is their
contract description."
4 See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Bob Matick Chevrolet, Inc., 239 A.2d 42 (Conn. 1967);
Enix v. Diamond T. Sales & Serv. Co., 188 So. 2d 48 (Fla. App. 1966), cert. denied,
[Vol. 63
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be in accord with the views of various commentators who con-
tend that it is reasonable for the purchaser of a used car to
expect that it should be suitable to drive without fear of immi-
nent peril. 9
IV. STRicT LiArLrrY FOR SELLERS OF USED
PRODUCTS IN KENTUCKY
The prospects for application of the strict liability doctrine
to sellers of used products in Kentucky are at best uncertain.
Because the Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue, any
prediction concerning this extension of strict liability must be
based upon an analysis of the Court's past approach to the
doctrine. However, as exemplified by two recent cases dealing
with strict liability in the contexts of defective design and by-
stander recovery, the Court's approach has been less than con-
sistent, making prognostication even more difficult.
In Jones v. Hutchinson Manufacturing Co. 50 the Court dec-
lined to impose strict liability upon the manufacturer of a defi-
ciently designed product. The case involved a five-year-old girl
who had been injured by a grain auger when she inexplicably
released the chain which connected the sides of the truck in
which she was riding and slid through a trap door in the rear
of the truck onto the auger. The plaintiff sued the manufac-
turer and retailer on negligence and strict liability theories,
alleging that the equipment had been deficiently designed.
Evidence was introduced to show that the auger could be de-
signed in such a manner as to prevent the injury. The Court of
Appeals, although ostensibly deciding the case on the basis of
strict liability, reverted to the traditional negligence tests for
its decision." Noting that this was the first Kentucky case of
195 So. 2d 566 (1967). Compare Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 484 P.2d 299 (Ore. 1971),
noted in 8 WiLuAmrE L.J. 94 (1972).
4' Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Prod-
ucts-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938 (1957); Prosser, The Implied Warranty
of Merchantable Quality, 27 MwN. L. REv. 117 (1943).
502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973).
5 Id. at 69: "There are, in addition, two particular areas in which the liability of
the manufacturer, even though it may occasionally be called strict, appears to rest
primarily upon a departure from proper standards of care, so that the tort is essentially
a matter of negligence. One of these involves the design of the product. . . ." (quoting
PROSSER ON ToRs at 644). For an analysis of the Court's construction of the law on
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
alleged deficient product design since the adoption of the strict
liability doctrine in Dealers Transport Co. v. Battery Distribut-
ing Co., 12 the Court stated that, in cases involving deficient
design, ". . . the distinction between the so-called strict liabil-
ity principle and negligence is of no practical significance so far
as the standard of conduct required of the defendant is con-
cerned."53 The Court's refusal to extend the application of the
strict liability doctrine to manufacturers of products which are
defective because deficiently designed seems to indicate a re-
strictive attitude toward the doctrine, which would make its
extension to sellers of used products unlikely.
In marked contrast to Jones, however, is the Court's subse-
quent decision in Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. 4 The plain-
tiff in this case was a woman who was severely cut by flying
glass from a soft drink bottle which exploded. At the time of
the accident she was shopping in a market and, under the
circumstances, was not a consumer of the product, but merely
a bystander. The trial court directed a verdict for the defen-
dants on the ground that strict liability does not extend beyond
users and consumers of products to bystanders.5 The Court of
Appeals, addressing the issue of bystander recovery under
strict liability for the first time, reversed and held: "The pro-
tections of Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d extend
to bystanders whose injury from the defective product is rea-
sonably foreseeable."' ,
Although the Jones and Embs cases are not in direct con-
flict, they do appear to evince differing approaches and atti-
tudes toward the doctrine of strict liability. In both cases the
Court was defining the scope of the doctrine, yet in Embs it
this point, see Comment, Products Liability: Is Section 402A Strict Liability Really
Strict in Kentucky?, 62 Ky. L.J. 866 (1973).
52 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965).
51 502 S.W.2d at 69-70. See also Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346 (6th
Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit, citing Jones, interpreted the Kentucky law concerning
strict liability for defective design as based on two principles: (1) liability will be
imposed only for failure to exercise reasonable care in the design, and (2) the manufac-
turer is not an insurer that the product is incapable of producing injury.
" C.A. No. 12,236 (Ky., May 23, 1975).
5 The ruling by the trial court was in accord with the late Judge Swinford's
interpretation of Kentucky law in Davidson v. Leadingham, 294 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.
Ky. 1968).
C.A. No. 12,236 at 7.
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chose to expand the doctrine, while in Jones the Court reverted
to a negligence standard of liability for design deficiencies. On
the other hand, there are some important distinctions between
the two cases which could account, at least in part, for their
apparent inconsistency. First, in Em bs the Court observed that
virtually "no jurisdiction which has adopted strict tort liability
has rejected the bystanders claim."5 However, as the Jones
opinion notes, there has been no such unanimity concerning
the manufacturer's duty with regard to design. In addition,
Embs extends the scope of the doctrine to an additional class
of plaintiffs, whereas in Jones the Court declined to impose
strict liability on another class of products and defendants.
Despite these distinctions, there is an element of inconsistency
in the Court's approach in these cases which is difficult to
reconcile.
Nevertheless, analysis of the Embs decision reveals signifi-
cant similarities between the Court's reasoning and the theo-
ries advanced in the Peterson case. In Embs the Court stated:
Our expressed public policy will be furthered if we minimize
the risk of personal injury and property damage by charging
the costs of injuries against the manufacturer who can pro-
cure liability insurance and distribute its expense among the
public as a cost of doing business; and since the risk of harm
from defective products exists for mere bystanders and pas-
sersby as well as for the purchaser or user, there is no substan-
tial reason for protecting one class of persons and not the
other. The same policy requires us to maximize protection for
the injured third party and promote the public interest in
discouraging the marketing of products having defects that
are a menace to the public by imposing strict liability upon
retailers and wholesalers in the distributive chain responsible
for marketing the defective product which injures the by-
stander. The imposition of strict liability places no unreason-
able burden upon sellers because they can adjust the cost of
insurance protection among themselves in the course of their
continuing business relationship. 8
In the language quoted above, and throughout the Embs opin-
ion, there are elements of both the insurance and dealer deter-




rence theories which the Illinois court relied upon in Peterson.
Consequently, the Embs decision, standing alone, allows the
conclusion that the Kentucky Court of Appeals would be pre-
disposed to apply strict liability to sellers of used automobiles
or other goods.
As noted, however, the prospects for the imposition of
strict liability upon sellers of used products in Kentucky re-
main uncertain. Although the Embs decision indicates a rather
liberal approach to defining the scope of strict liability, thereby
increasing the possibility that Kentucky will eventually follow
Illinois in imposing strict liability on dealers of used products,
the Jones opinion and the attitude which it reflects must also
be accounted for. In the final analysis, of course, the Court of
Appeals must define the scope of the strict liability doctrine by
determining whether public policy would best be served by
imposing strict liability on all sellers in the chain of distribu-
tion, including those who sell used products, or by drawing the
line at the retailer and refusing to extend strict liability to the
dealer in used goods.
Marjorie Jones Reeder
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